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Executive Summary
This paper is an examination of the determinants of Family Support employee
allocation. Specifically, related to Kentucky, the goal of this research is to determine if public
assistance caseloads are equitable across nine geographic regions. A review of relevant
literature provides a larger context to this topic. Literature primarily suggests three mechanisms
by which Family Support resources might be allocated: legal regulations, postcode lottery, and
Tiebout migration.
Supported by literature the larger context for this paper leads to the examination of five
independent variables: (1) percent of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program recipients \,
(2) total population, (3) percent of the population over 65, (4) percent population identified as
white, and (5) percent below poverty. The dependent variable for this study is the number of
Family Support personnel per region. Since the dependent variable was reported on a regional
level an adjustment to the independent variable data. Level f aggregations of the 720 panel
observations for the independent variables were collapsed into a regional level of 54
observations. The remaining 54 observations were then subjected to both fixed-effects and
between effects regression analyses.
The output of these analyses suggests that Family Support personnel were allocated to
each region in a uniform standard. However, the primary factors in this allocation were more
related to demographic variables than to the number of public assistance recipients. This
means that the variation of Family Support personnel between the regions has a discriminatory
effect as regions with younger populations will receive fewer resources.
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I. Introduction
The Kentucky Department for Community Based Services (DCBS) encompasses two
divisions: (1) Family Support and (2) Protection/Permanency. Adult and child protective services
programs are administered by Protection/Permanency. Family Support is charged with
determining eligibility for all entitlement programs administered by the DCBS, such as
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Medicaid and the Kentucky Transitional
Assistance Program (K-TAP).
With annual expenditures of more than $1 billion,1 DCBS is facing increased scrutiny of
its resource allocation. Recently, Kentucky-based news agencies have attempted to draw a
causal link between the number of child abuse deaths and the allocation of
Protection/Permanency personnel. The investigative reports by the local news pushed the
Kentucky legislature to create a special investigative committee to review child abuse deaths.
Currently, the scope of this legislative investigation is limited to Protection/Permanency. The
question this author attempts to answer is if DCBS is mismanaging one division is there also
mismanagement of Family Support? The purpose of this paper is to examine the allocation of
personnel within the division of Family Support personnel allocation to see if this resource has
been allocated proportionally to caseloads.
At present, Family Support has at least one office in each of Kentucky’s 120 counties. In
total, Family Support has 1,822 employees to allocate across the state. However, even a cursory
review of Family Support office locations suggests that the number of offices does not coincide

1

Kentucky’s Transparency Portal, Spending Search. http://opendoor.ky.gov/search/Pages/spendingsearch.aspx.
accessed 4/7/14.
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with population density. For instance, Fayette County (pop. 305,489) has one office, Jefferson
County has eight (pop. 750,828), and Bell County (pop. 28,183) has two.
Family Support strives to allocate personnel in a uniform manner and has developed a
case-weight system to compare worker productivity.2 A case-weight system is needed because
Family Support cross-trains its employees, meaning that the same employee may process SNAP
and Medicaid applications on the same day. The DCBS Commissioner’s Office has assigned
different weights to each application type, ranging from 0.5 to 5.0. These numbers were
originally based on the average number of hours needed to process the corresponding type of
application. For instance, a SNAP application is given a weight of 2.0 while a K-TAP case is
weighted at 2.5. These weights give administrators the ability to measure individual
productivity and ensure a uniform caseload statewide.
Equity of caseloads is important for Family Support because inequitable caseloads have
been tied to lower employee retention rates (Barbee, 2011). Kentucky’s FY 2012 – 2014 budget
exempted Family Support from budget cuts because caseloads had increased 30 percent since
2007. During the research process of this paper, the author spoke with a director-level Family
Support employee who said, “We don’t really go by the case weights anymore…there’s not
really a system for who get[s] what. The regional staff keep[s] records on who works where.”3
This admission of potential mismanagement and shifting economic conditions anecdotally
suggests that Family Support personnel may not be allocated uniformly.

2

Division of Family Support Operations Manual, Vol.1 Sec. 0080
http://manuals.chfs.ky.gov/dcbs_manuals/DFS/VOLI/OMVOLI.pdf accessed 4/7/14.
3
Eldridge, Donna. Interview. February 2014
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The following analysis will focus on measuring the relationship between the number of
Family Support caseworkers and their caseloads. The goal of measuring this relationship is to
find which determinants affect Family Support personnel allocation. Section II is a review of
literature on public assistance caseloads, and section III is an overview of the research design
used in this study. Section IV contains the results of the research design. Section V is a
collection of the conclusions, limitations and future research.

II.

Literature Review
Questions about the effectiveness of public assistance programs in the United States

have inspired a large amount of literature. Most literature is focused on the economic impacts
of these programs and the corresponding budgetary implications. Within this broad scope of
public assistance, many theories examine the impacts of social service allocation. This study
examines three theories that may explain Family Support personnel allocation: (1) legal
analysis, (2) postcode lottery and (3) Tiebout migration.

Legal Analysis
Legal analysis suggests that the allocation of employees across regions follows the rules
and standards set out in stautes and regulations. Located within Kentucky’s Executive Brach,
the Division of Family Support is an extension of the Department for Community Based
Services. Its authorizing legal framework includes guidelines for the provision of public
assistance benefits. One of the implications of these guidelines for Family Support caseloads is
that the services must not be provided in a discriminatory manner. For instance, if there are
6

inequitable caseloads, these must not be to the detriment of protected classes of beneficiaries.
To do such would be a type of discrimination that Kentucky Courts have rejected.
This situation previously occurred in Kentucky when the Supreme Court ruled in Rose v.
Council (1989) that disparate funding allocations to rural and urban schools were a violation of
state law (Hoyt, N.D.).4 The ruling also resulted in Kentucky’s education reforms of the 1990s.
Maintaining equitable Family Support caseloads avoids discrimination and potential illegality
(based upon previous precedent), which is an acknowledgement of the role U.S. Courts can
have in public assistance administration.

Postcode Lottery
In many settings, the allocation of social services between localities differs from what
would be expected by legal analysis. In British studies, such unwarranted geographic variation is
often referred to as postcode lottery (Cummins, 2007). The term does not imply intent or
ignorance but is simply the result of non-uniform resource allocation. Postcode lotteries of
public services are often caused by resource allocations that do not take into account the full
complexities of populations. This means that resources were allocated according to a simple
formula that would not take into account additional demographic variables that influence
resource consumption.
Public assistance resources allocated without consideration of demographic and cultural
variables are likely to create postcode lotteries. Demographic and cultural variables can affect
4

Supreme Court Justices in Kentucky are politically elected, so it is possible that even though the underpinnings of
case logic are the same, there could be a different decision if Rose v. Council were retried. Funding mechanisms for
K-12 public education in Kentucky include a mixture of local funds. Family Support is entirely funded through the
Kentucky’s general fund so this could alter the statutory underpinnings of the majority decision in Rose v. Council.
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both public assistance eligibility and the participation rates of public assistance. For instance,
non-white Medicaid applicants are more likely to be misinformed about benefit eligibility
(Bradley, 2005). Single-parent households are also disproportionately eligible for public
assistance benefits (Ayala, 2005). Minority and parental status are not the only demographic
variables that affect public assistance participation. They are, however, an example of how
demographic and cultural characteristics vary across geographic areas and can influence
demand for public assistance programs.
While postcode lottery is typically a European term, there is anecdotal evidence that
suggests Family Support resources are allocated in inequitable concentrations. Literature often
focuses on the individual impact of postcode lotteries. However, agencies, like individuals, are
affected by postcode lotteries. Previous studies have attempted to determine why the
retention rate among Family Support employees is lower than other peer organizations. The
taxpayer cost to replace one Family Support caseworker is between $15,000 and $19,000
(Barbee, 2011 and Yankeelov, 2009). What these studies found was that there is a significant
difference in Family Support retention rates geographically. The root cause of the disparate
retention rates was assigned to inequitable caseloads between rural and urban Family Support
offices.

Tiebout Migration
The idea of a postcode lottery is that the best government services are received mainly
by chance. Another possibility is that the American belief in free markets has created an
economy where residents will choose to live in a community that maximizes their utility. In
8

other words, Americans are content with inequitable distribution of government services
because the inequity gives citizens a choice. This conscious choice to relocate in order to
receive the level of government benefits desired (and thus taxes paid) is known as Tiebout
migration (Tiebout, 1956). While there is no consensus on this issue, several studies have
shown that there are causal links between interstate migration and level of public assistance
benefits available (Cebula, 2013 and Hsing, 1995). For instance, Hsing found that states can
expect a 0.40 percent increase in immigration for each one-percent increase in public
assistance benefits. In 1992, California enacted a law to restrict public assistance benefits for
new residents as legislators believed that California’s more generous social service programs
were attracting immigration to the state. This law was later struck down by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Sáenz v. Roe (Sáenz, 1999).
Within Kentucky, there is no regional or local monetary difference in public assistance
benefits offered. However, there are measurable differences between counties and cities as far
as tax accessed on wages, property and businesses. In tandem with the quality of Family
Support services available, it is possible that there is a Tiebout migration of individuals within
Kentucky. Clients who are serviced by overburdened caseworkers are more likely to encounter
errors with their applications. Kentucky is unable to provide an accurate estimate of the
economic impact application errors have on public assistance programs (LRC, 2004). Without
an accurate estimate, it is unknown what percentage of type of processing errors, by
overburdened caseworkers is in the client’s favor. Clients who are serviced by overburdened
caseworkers and who marginally qualify for programs are also more likely not to enroll as they
face an artificial administrative burden (Moynihan, 2013). Therefore, a public assistance-eligible
9

individual could maximize their utility by relocating to an area with greater Family Support
resources. Previous studies have indicated that there is no geographic pattern to tax effort by
Kentucky localities, so it is possible that individuals could maximize their utility by moving a
relatively minor distance (Hoyt, N.D.).
Within the framework of Tiebout migration, potential inequity of Family Support
caseloads could be economically ideal to Kentucky residents. However, the legality of such a
conscious inequity in caseloads is questionable under the previous precedents set by the
Kentucky Supreme Court. In sum, the legal analysis suggests that public assistance caseloads
should be uniform in nature. However, if there is caseload inequity the theories of postcode
lotteries and Tiebout migration could explain potential determinants of Family Support
caseload. This study creates a research design, based upon the literature review, to find the
determinants of Family Support personnel allocation.

III. Research Design
To determine if Family Support caseloads are equitable, the first task is to determine a
good measurement of personnel allocation if legal the analysis was correct. The first
independent variables selected for this study were region population and the percent of SNAP
recipients. Percent of SNAP recipients is simply the number of SNAP enrollees divided by the
total region population. This measure was chosen as it directly contributes to the size of Family
Support caseloads.
The literature in section II suggests that postcode lottery or Tiebout migration also could
influence the size of Family Support caseloads. To test the possibility of Tiebout migration and
10

related economic conditions, percent below poverty was added as an independent variable.
The rationale behind this selection is that the individuals who vote with their feet and move to
an area with better public-assistance service are most likely to be the recipients of such service.
A good indicator of possible eligibility for public assistance is the percent below poverty.
Tiebout migration could be present if caseloads are more responsive the clustering of poverty.
Last, two other variables were selected to help determine if caseloads are proportional
to the demographics of their corresponding communities or if there is the possibility of a
postcode lottery. Those two variables are the percent of population over the age of 65 and the
percent of white population. Senior and minority populations receive public assistance at
higher proportions than other segments of society so these variables could show if caseloads
are allocated according to census data.
The null hypothesis (H0) for this study is that the legal analysis is validated and none of
the independent variables representing Tiebout migration or a postcode lottery (percent over
65, percent white and percent below poverty) affects the number of Family Support personnel.
The alternative hypothesis (HA) is that either Tiebout migration or a postcode lottery has the
largest effect on the number of Family Support personnel. Prior to this analysis, I expected to
accept the null hypothesis given the legal analysis and the presence of Family Support’s caseweight system.
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Dependent Variable
The first course of action when collecting data for this study was to focus on the
dependent variable: the number of Family Support employees per region. Currently, the
Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS) only publishes the number of CHFS employees in
each county. In January 2014, I sent a formal open records request to the DCBS Commissioner,
Teresa James, for the number of Family Support personnel by county. The open records request
was approved, and six years of data was released: 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2013. All
six years of the data were used for this study; however, there are several issues in the reporting
that needed to be addressed. First, the employee data that DCBS keeps is only on a regional
level and not on a county level. DCBS has nine geographic regions within Kentucky, and each
region is allowed to allocate personnel according to its individual needs. The Commissioner’s
Office does not keep track of where Family Support employees are assigned once a region is
given permission to fill a position. In the analysis, I match the regional reporting of the
dependent variable by aggregating the independent variables into a regional level as well.
The second concern regarding the dependent variable is the missing years of data. DCBS
is unable to give employee numbers pre-2006 because that data was stored on its previous
human resources software and was not imported into the new program. According to DCBS,
data for 2010 and 2011 also is not available, but there is no explanation for why this data was
lost. The data pre-2006 should not affect this study because DCBS was created in 2004. Data
before this time period is simply nonexistent. The missing 2010 and 2011 data is not expected
to contain any unpredictable variation in personnel allocation. There were no budgeted
changes to the level of staff in these years. The 2012 Commonwealth budget allocated an
12

additional 300 personnel to DCBS.5 The 2012 and 2013 data will show how this increase in
personnel was allocated.
The final concern with the dependent variable data is that the data was compiled by
DCBS in inconsistent time periods. Data for 2006 and 2007 reflect the employee totals for
November of those respective years. 2008 and 2012 data were compiled in October of those
years. 2009 was collected in May, and 2013 was collected in December. Family Support does
not have seasonal employment or temporary employees. Each reported position is a full-time
position, so it is unlikely that the inconsistent measurement would influence the data by way of
a hiring cycle. As such, the inconsistent measurements should not alter the reliability of the
data more than a marginal amount.
This trio of dependent variable data issues (regional level, missing years and inconsistent
definitions) gives concern that DCBS is not equipped to effectively manage Family Support.
However, the aforementioned adjustments were made before the data were organized into the
panel dataset. There are 54 observations of Family Support personnel in the panel dataset (9
regions by 6 years). Included in this dataset are five independent variables. Each independent
variable was aggregated from county-level data to match the regional nature of the dependent
variable. The aggregation was completed by taking the means of county-level and data then
adding a weight for county population. This gives the county-level data the effect of
proportional representation within the regional aggregation. Last, the independent variables
5

Additional money was also allocated in 2013 and 2014 to hire more Family Support staff. The executive budget
for these years states that, “caseloads in Family Support which have increased by over 30 percent since 2007. This
investment will fund additional front-line benefit workers, reducing caseloads by approximately 14 percent over
the biennium in the areas of Medicaid Eligibility, State Supplementation, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,
and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps).” http://www.osbd.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/28C22F948799-47C4-9627-3CF8B40C388F/0/1214ExecBudBudInBrief.pdf
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measured in the number of persons were converted into percentages of the regional
population. This final step was taken as regions are geographic in nature and do not have equal
populations. For example, the Southern Bluegrass (pop. 593,966) region which includes
Lexington, Ky., has 207 Family Support employees, compared to the Eastern Mountain region
(pop. 265,008) which has 202 Family Support Employees. The percentage nature of the
demographic data allows for an easier analysis of the results to come.

Independent Variables
Given the literature review which concludes that caseloads should legally be equal, the
first two independent variables collected were region population and the percent of SNAP
recipients per region. The total number of residents in a region will affect the anticipated
number of potential public-assistance eligible persons and serves as a baseline for the other
four independent variables. The second variable is the total number of individuals who receive
SNAP benefits as reported by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, divided by the total
population of the corresponding region. The percent of SNAP recipients is relevant to the
dependent variable because it directly shows how many applications Family Support employees
are processing within a region. While Family Support employees also process Medicaid and KTAP applications, these measures were not used as independent variables because of
collinearity between the three programs. For instance, the correlation between SNAP and
Medicaid was calculated in STATA to be 0.97. Between the public assistance programs, the
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percentage of SNAP recipients per region was chosen as the independent variable because it is
the most representative measure of Family Support caseloads. 6
The third independent variable is the percent of population over the age of 65. This
group, along with the fourth variable (percent of white individuals), was collected in order to
control for demographic differences between the regions. Additionally, it has been established
that there are knowledge gaps between age and ethnic groups in terms of public assistance
programs (Moynihan, 2013). The percent over the age of 65 and the percent of white
individuals will test for the existence of a postcode lottery by way of demographic inequities.
The data for both variables were obtained from the Centers for Disease Control. Before this
study, it was expected that the percent of individuals over the age of 65 would have a positive
relationship with the dependent variable as seniors can qualify for additional Medicaid
programs. The percent of white individuals did not have an expected relationship because of its
relationship to overall population and to the number of minorities present.
The last variable gathered for this study is the percent below poverty. This variable was
selected to help control for macroeconomic conditions that affect the number of public
assistance recipients. The data were also gathered from the Cabinet for Health and Family
Services. Percent below poverty is expected to have a positive relationship to the dependent

6

The variance infatuation factor was calculated in STATA and produced the following results. Medicaid, 605; SNAP,
323; KTAP, 62. Since the collinearity between the three programs is so high the numbers of Medicaid and

K-TAP recipients were not selected as independent variables. The number of Medicaid recipients is not
as good a measure as SNAP recipients because Kentucky is a 1634 SSI state, which means that 201,195
of the current 829,826 Medicaid beneficiaries do not interface with Family Support to receive Medicaid.
(KY DMS, 2014) Instead, they receive Medicaid automatically when Social Security establishes SSI
eligibility. Additionally, K-TAP primarily services urban recipients, so these two variables have more
potential to alter the results of this study as compared with the number of SNAP recipients.
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variable as it correlated to the number of individuals potentially eligible for public assistance.7
Table 1 summarizes all the variables with their abbreviations from the model, description,
expected sign and source.

Table 1. Variable Descriptions
Name
Dependent Variable
CHFSEmployees

Description
Number of Family Support
Employees (per region)

Ex. Sign

Source

N/A

DCBS Open Records

(+)

http://chfs.ky.gov

(+)

http://chfs.ky.gov/dms

(+)

http://wonder.cdc.gov

(-/+)

http://wonder.cdc.gov

Independent Variable
Percent of SNAP Recipients (per
region)
Population
Population (per region)
Percent Over the Age of 65 (per
PercentOver
region)
Percent Identified as White (per
PercentWhite
region)
PercentBelowPoverty Percent Below Poverty (per region)
PercentSNAP

(+)

http://chfs.ky.gov

Exp. Sign = Expected Sign
(+) = positive effect
(-) = negative effect
N/A = not applicable

Research Models
The nature of the panel dataset used for this study is that it observes the same
dependent variable across time. The sample size of this analysis is the number of Family
Support regions, 9, times the number of years observed, 6, for a total of 54 observations. The
dependent variable is defined as the number of Family Support personnel per region. As
previously stated, the independent variables were aggregated from county-level data into
7

Additional independent variables were analyzed but not included in this analysis because they were co-linear
with the existing variables. These omitted variables include the percent of K-TAP recipients, percent of Medicaid
recipients, average household income, unemployment rate, and square miles of each region.
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regional level in order to match the sample size of the dependent variable. The Family Support
regions are geographically oriented, and a simple mean would have distorted the results of
each region as there are often urban and rural counties in the same observation. So, a
weighted-average aggregation proportional to county population was completed in STATA. This
weighted average gives the aggregated regional data proportional representation within the
panel dataset.

Fixed-Effects Model
Since the panel dataset consists of six years, two regression models were used for this study:
fixed-effects and between-effects. The first model selected was the fixed-effects which hold
constant the observed and unobserved characteristics of each region. Fixed-effects are used
when attempting to measure time-series information. The benefit of this approach is that it
reduces the possibility of omitted variable bias that could otherwise be present in a simple
ordinary least squares regression. The equation for this fixed-effects model is as follows:
Yr = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + αr + ε
Yr represents the number of Family Support personnel allocated to an individual region. X1 – X6
represents the six independent variables (region population, percent SNAP, percent over 65,
percent white, and percent below poverty). αr represents the fixed effects for each region while
ε is the random error of variables not included in the model. Below, in table 2, the summary
statistics of the independent variables are listed for this fixed-effects model.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variable
Number of Family Support
Employees (per region)
Total Population (per
region)
Percent of SNAP Recipients
(per region)
Percent of Population Over
the age of 65 (per region)
Percent of Population
Identified as White (per
region)
Percent Below Poverty (per
region)

Obs
54
54

Mean
182.5

St. Dev
41.1

107,883.7 218,991.8

Min
119.0

Max
292.0

18,237.4 750,828.0

54

18.2

6.8

9.4

34.9

54

13.5

1.4

11.1

16.3

54

90.1

6.9

71.4

97.7

54

19.7

5.8

11.5

32.3

Obs = Number of Observations
St. Dev = Standard Deviation

Between-Effects Model
A between-effects model also was used for this study to measure the cross-sectional effects of
the independent variables. Where fixed-effects measure the variation over time within the
regions, between-effects measure the variation across the regions. Since this model uses the
same panel dataset as the fixed-effects, the summary statistics are the same as presented
earlier in table 2.

IV. Results
The results of both models indicate that three of the independent variables will have a
measurable impact on the number of Family Support employees in a region. First, the results of
the fixed-effects model are presented in Table 3. From this model, it can be concluded that the
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distribution of Family Support employees is not equitable across the state. This will be further
explained after Table 4.
Table 3. Fixed-Effects Results

Variables
Total Population (1000s)
Percent of SNAP Recipients
Percent of Population Over the
age of 65
Percent of Population Identified as
White
Percent Below Poverty
Constant

Total Family Support
Employees per Region
Coefficient
Standard Error
0.638*
0.3702
-8.862***
2.265
37.963***

9.213

-7.412***
0.003
423.151

1.816
1.100
189.399

Observations = 54
R-Squared = 0.51
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table 4. Between-Effects Results

Variables
Total Population (1000s)
Percent of SNAP Recipients
Percent of Population Over the
age of 65
Percent of Population Identified as
White
Percent Below Poverty
Constant

Total Family Support
Employees per Region
Coefficient
Standard Error
-0.0686
0.291
12.366
24.957
-1.574

14.262

-4.562
-7.65E+00
545.818

8.780
2.56E+01
955.259

Observations = 54
R-Squared = 0.04
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 4, above, contains the results of the between-effects model. None of the variables
in this model has a p-value less than .05. However, this is not surprising as the regional nature
of the data has reduced the total number of observations. The lack of statistically significant
findings in the between-effects model contrasts with the results in Table 3.
In Table 3, the percent of SNAP recipients has a negative effect on the number of Family
Support employees at the 0.01 level. With each one-percent increase in the number of SNAP
recipients, the number of Family Support employees decreases by -8.86. This is opposite of the
earlier prediction of a positive relationship.
Another prediction proven wrong by these results is the relationship of caseworkers and
the percent of the white population. The previous prediction was that there would be no
relationship. Instead, the results show that a one-percent increase in the number of white
individuals decreases the number of Family Support employees -7.41. This is interesting
especially when compared to the region population which has a positive relationship with the
dependent variable. However, the region population does not have statistical significance
below the 0.05 level.
The next statistically significant variable was the percent of population over the age of
65. The fixed effects model shows that a one-percent increase in the senior population has an
increase of 37.96 Family Support employees at the 0.01 level. Last, the percent below poverty
did not have statistical significance in either model. This variable has a positive relationship as
predicted but is not a reliable measure of Family Support employee allocation. Since three of
the five independent variables in the fixed-effects model have statistical significance at the 0.05
level or less, the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected.
20

Interpretation of Results
Having determined that the null hypothesis (H0) can be rejected, the threat of
committing a type I error is not significant based on the results presented in Table 3. The main
question of this study is if Family Support employees have been allocated equitably according
to a legal analysis. The coefficients of the fixed-effects model provide the answer to that
question. Four of the variables are quantified as a measure of population. Within this group,
the percent of population over the age of 65 has the largest effect on the number of Family
Support employees with a coefficient of 37.96. The fixed-effects suggest that a region will have
more family support workers when it has an increasing number of seniors.
The results show that neither the legal analysis, postcode lottery, or Tiebout migration
can explain inequity in Family Support caseloads. The postcode-lottery theory is rejected as the
between-effects model was not able to produce any statistically significant results. Had the
between-effects model produced significant results the conclusion would have been made that
caseload inequity is a response to demographic clustering. However, this is not the case. The
statistically insignificant results in the between-effects model suggest that none of the five
independent variables has a cross-sectional effect on Family Support allocation. In other words,
Family Support personnel allocation has changed more over time. This time series change is
partly because of the 300 extra Family Support workers that were hired in the Commonwealth’s
last budget cycle and general shifts in the population.
Both the fixed-effects and between-effects models also do not provide sufficient
evidence to conclude that Tiebout migration is responsible for caseload inequity. The variable
percent below poverty was selected as the measure of this theory and does not have
21

significance in either model. If Tiebout migration had explanatory power it would be more
logical that Family Support employee allocation would be more responsive to the percent
below poverty.
Without the ability to explain caseload inequity by way of a postcode lottery or Tiebout
migration, the author concludes that the legal analysis still remains the principled way to
allocate Family Support personnel. This means that the variation of Family Support personnel
between the regions is age discriminatory as the variation in caseloads is more responsive to
the percent of population over the age of 65 than to other explanatory variables. While age is a
qualifying factor for Medicaid, seniors do not represent a disproportionate share of Medicaid
applications. The latest count shows that individuals over the age of 65 represent only 9.9
percent of Kentucky Medicaid beneficiaries (KY DMS, 2014). Yet, according to data collected for
this study, seniors represent 14.1 percent of Kentucky’s population. Therefore, Family Support
caseloads are age discriminatory.

V. Summary
With an F-value of the fixed-effects model of <0.01, it is the opinion of the author that
this study has found a statistical relationship between the number of seniors and the allocation
of Family Support personnel. After an analysis of the empirical results and relevant literature,
this study reaches the conclusion that Family Support employees are not allocated equitably.
However, even though the results and conclusions of this study have descriptive power, there
are limitations to this conclusion. First, the reliability of the dependent variable data is
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questionable as previously outlined in section III. A more disaggregated collection of variables
on the county level could provide more results or more accurate conclusions.
Second, there are other variables not included in this model that could potentially
explain the difference in Family Support employee allocation. The fixed-effects model has an rsquared value of 0.51. Footnote four explains which other variables were tested but not
included in either model. Further research could develop a more comprehensive panel dataset
that would achieve a higher r-squared value.
Last, the results of this paper are not generalizable outside of Kentucky. The economic
and population data used in this study is unique to Kentucky and would not reflect an accurate
analysis of other departments. The dependent variable data supplied by DCBS also is not
relevant to other states as other states have different program eligibility requirements,
application processes and bureaucratic structures that make their public assistance
departments unique.

Future Research
The focus of this research has been the allocation of Family Support personnel for the
years 2006 – 2013. Beginning January 1, 2014, Kentucky opted to expand Medicaid eligibility
under the Affordable Care Act. In preparing for this expansion, Kentucky introduced a new
Family Support call center, online application process and a re-alignment of Family Support
offices. While this study could help guide the current re-alignment of Family Support
employees, future research may find this study increasingly to be obsolete. However, given the
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current findings of employee inequity, future research is encouraged in order to ensure
continuous accountability of Family Support resources.
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Data Sources
Division of Family Support Employees
The number of Division of Family Support Employees was obtained through an open
records request submitted on January 22, 2014 to Commissioner Teresa James. Dorcas
Peach, Human Resource Branch Manager provided the data sets for 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2012 & 2013.
Population (2006 – 2013)
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book.
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014.
SNAP Recipients (2006 – 2013)
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book.
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014.
K-TAP Recipients (2006 – 2013)
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book.
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014.
Medicaid Recipients (2006 – 2013)
Department for Medicaid Services. MS 264 Report and Supplements.
http://chfs.ky.gov/dms/stats.htm Accessed March 7, 2014.
Population Below Poverty (2006 – 2013)
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book.
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014.
Population Unemployed (2006 – 2013)
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book.
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014.
Population (Caucasian) 2006 – 2013
Center for Disease Control. Bridged-Race Population Estimates.
http://wonder.cdc.gov/Bridged-Race-v2012.HTML Accessed March 7, 2014.
Population (Age 65 and Over) 2006 – 2013
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Center for Disease Control. Bridged-Race Population Estimates.
http://wonder.cdc.gov/Bridged-Race-v2012.HTML Accessed March 7, 2014.
Average Household Income (2006 – 2013)
Cabinet for Health and Family Services Data Book.
http://chfs.ky.gov/dcbs/data_book.htm Accessed March 7, 2014.
Square Miles (2006 – 2013)
United States Census Bureau. State and County QuickFacts.
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html Accessed March 7, 2014.
This measure is the land area in square miles, 2010.
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Appendix
A.

Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Y
Population
PercentSNAP
PercentOver
Percent White
PercentBelowPoverty
Constant

Y
Population
PercentSNAP
PercentOver
Percent White
PercentBelowPoverty
Constant

Fixed-Effects Model
TCoef.
Err.
stat
0.00
0.00 1.75
-8.86
2.27 -3.91
37.96
9.21 4.12
-7.41
1.82 -4.08
0.00
1.10 0.00
423.15 189.40 2.23

Pvalue
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.99
0.03

Between-Effects Model
TCoef.
Err.
stat
0.00
0.00 -0.24
12.37 24.96 0.50
-1.57 14.26 -0.11
-4.56
8.78 -0.52
-7.65 25.60 -0.30
545.82 955.26 0.57

Pvalue
95% Conf. Int.
0.83
0.00
0.00
0.65
-67.06
91.79
0.92
-46.96
43.81
0.64
-32.50
23.38
0.78
89.13
73.82
0.61 -2494.24 3585.88

95% Conf. Int.
0.00
0.00
-13.48
-4.24
19.17
56.75
-11.12
-3.71
-2.85
2.86
36.87 809.43

Coef = coefficient
Err = Robust Standard Error
T-stat = t-statistic
95% Conf. Int. = 95% Confidence Interval
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